



Johnson, Carol 2018, The idealogical context: election 2016, in Double dissolution: the 2016 
Australian election, / Gauja, A., Chen, P., Curtin, J., Pietsch, J. (ed./s), Ch.3, pp.59-80 
 
 
This title is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 









































The Ideological Contest: 
Election 2016
Carol Johnson
Analysing the ideological components of election campaigns can provide 
key insights into the arguments that parties use to try to influence voters 
and the differences in their policy positions.1 This is particularly so in the 
case of the 2016 election campaign, which arguably saw a more explicit 
and substantial ideological divide than many recent elections. However, as 
usual, the term ideology was only used pejoratively to criticise opponents’ 
incorrect views, rather than being something that parties positively claimed 
for themselves. This chapter outlines the key features of this ideological 
contest, limiting its analysis to the two major parties: Labor and Liberal. 
The two major parties’ ideological differences are focused on because 
their ideological contest is the one that is most crucial for influencing 
the formation of government. Furthermore, it would not be feasible to 
cover the ideology of all the minor parties contesting the 2016 election 
in one chapter, even the most significant ones such as the Nationals, the 
Greens, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the Nick Xenophon Team. 
Nonetheless, the major parties’ efforts to position themselves ideologically 
in regard to the minor parties will be examined. The major parties’ 
ideological differences will be explored through the prisms of the parties’ 
1  The concept of ideology is used here to refer to broad, umbrella-like frameworks of belief that 
can include differing strands (see further Johnson 2007: 15–20).
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economic and social policies. The  chapter will conclude by identifying 
some of the potential problems that the ideological contest posed for both 
major parties.
Labor and economic policy
Several months before the election was announced, Bill Shorten argued 
that Labor was quite explicitly engaging in a battle of ideas with the 
Coalition government (Shorten 2016b). Labor had been undertaking 
substantial policy work with that in mind. Indeed, policy differences soon 
became apparent as Shorten proudly stated that Labor had moved away 
from using a small-target election strategy (whereas, in recent election 
campaigns, Labor had often avoided stating controversial positions 
on social and economic issues) (Shorten 2016k; see also Marr 2016: 174). 
In particular, Labor positioned Malcolm Turnbull and the Coalition as 
supporting the big end of town and argued that the Coalition’s proposed 
tax cuts to business, their opposition to Labor’s attempts to restrict 
negative gearing, their budget cutbacks and their opposition to a Royal 
Commission into the banking sector were all evidence of this. Turnbull was 
depicted as elitist and out of touch with ordinary voters (Shorten 2016f ).
By contrast, Labor depicted itself as supporting the interests of the middle 
and working classes against the Coalition’s support for big business. 
It is ideologically significant that the word ‘class’ was quite explicitly 
mentioned in Labor’s campaign material, given that it had tended not 
to be mentioned in recent years.2 Even the Labor and union campaign 
against John Howard’s WorkChoices in the 2007 election had tended 
to use the term ‘working families’ as code for class. In line with that 
narrative, Shorten attempted to throw off his image as a ruthless, factional 
powerbroker (Marr 2016). He was depicted as a caring and empathetic 
person who believed government should ensure good-quality healthcare 
and education, the creation of jobs, good pay and working conditions, 
along with a strong welfare safety net (Shorten 2016f ).3
2  For example, the Labor website proudly proclaimed that: ‘A Shorten Labor Government will 
stand up for middle and working class families across Australia’ (see Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
n.d.-a).
3  Polling suggested that Shorten was indeed seen as more caring and empathetic than Turnbull, 
though Turnbull was seen as a more capable economic manager (Hudson 2016).
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Labor argued that Australian society had been characterised by a growing 
economic inequality that Coalition policies had fostered and that the 
election of a Turnbull government would worsen this situation (Shorten 
2016c). Indeed, issues of ‘inequality’ featured far more prominently and 
explicitly in this election campaign than in other recent Labor ones. Labor 
argued that such inequality was not only unjust, but also bad for the 
economy since: 
the best way to have sustainable economic growth in Australia is to have 
fair distribution of income. We’ve got to ensure that we have inclusive 
growth. Inequality—and it’s at a 75-year high—is a handbrake on 
economic growth (Shorten 2016d).
Labor produced a 138-page report, ‘Growing Together’, which quoted 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Nobel prize–winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz to back up Labor’s case that increasing inequality 
dampens economic growth, including via low incomes reducing people’s 
ability to consume (ALP n.d.-c). Shorten also argued that funding an 
excellent education system that produced highly skilled employees was 
essential for Australia’s economic growth and that properly funding 
Medicare was not just a social justice and equal opportunity measure, 
but also improved employees’ health and their ability to participate in the 
labour force (Shorten 2016c).
By contrast, voters faced the ‘same old Liberals; just give tax cuts to the top 
end of town and let the rest of the people just make do with not much at 
all’ (Shorten 2016h). Labor’s so-called ‘Mediscare’ campaign—in which 
Labor claimed that the Coalition was intent on privatising Medicare 
(rather than just undermining it by increasing the user-pays component)—
reinforced the Labor narrative, even though the accuracy of such claims 
was questioned by many commentators (ALP 2016; Shorten 2016m; for 
Turnbull’s denials see Turnbull 2016k). Shadow Treasurer Chris Bowen 
also outlined what he saw as the major (ideological) policy differences 
between Labor and the Liberals when it came to budget measures.
The differing approaches to fiscal repair between the two major parties this 
election could not be more stark. The Liberals’ Reagan-esque approach of 
delivering tax cuts for big business and hoping it will trickle down through 
the economy will blow an ever increasing hole in the Budget bottom-line. 
Labor will undertake responsible reforms in areas such as negative gearing 
and capital gains tax and will close tax loopholes to deliver ever increasing 
improvements to the Budget bottom-line (Bowen 2016a).
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Labor also argued that the Turnbull government had gone too far in 
its support for free trade. While supporting free trade agreements, 
Labor stated its support for ‘proper social democratic institutions and 
progressive policies’. Consequently, trade agreements needed to maximise 
the employment of Australians and avoid undermining ‘public policy 
in healthcare, the environment or labour rights’ (Wong 2015). Labor 
would not accept Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions 
in new trade agreements and would attempt to remove or mitigate 
such provisions in existing free trade agreements already negotiated by 
Coalition governments (Wong 2016a). Meanwhile, Shorten endorsed 
a ‘Made in Australia’ campaign, claiming: 
there’s a lot of blue-collar working-class and middle-class families 
who are sick of seeing all of our jobs being exported overseas, who are 
greatly sceptical that there aren’t rorts in some aspects of our visa system 
(Shorten 2016o).
Shorten was aware that dissatisfaction with globalisation and neoliberalism 
were reshaping politics internationally, as reflected in some voters’ support 
for Donald Trump in the United States (US) and Brexit in Britain. He 
argued that Labor’s plans for ‘inclusive growth’, good health and welfare 
systems along with good pay and working conditions (including penalty 
rates) were the best way of ensuring that voters’ needs were met and 
that they did not resort to extreme protest votes. By contrast, Turnbull’s 
policies, including his ‘tax policies for the elites’, would result in an 
economically ‘divided society’ and reflected the type of politics that many 
voters were rejecting internationally (Shorten 2016o).
So Labor was implying that Turnbull was influenced by a right-wing 
ideological belief in austerity-style cuts to the public sector, ‘trickle-
down’ economics and a reduction of necessary regulation in free trade 
agreements that would have dire consequences for ordinary Australians. 
In many respects, Labor seemed to be consolidating a move away from the 
neoliberal ideology that had influenced it under the Hawke and Keating 
governments and had begun to be questioned from the Rudd period 
on, despite some continuing flirtations with market-influenced policies 
(Johnson 2011).
However, Labor was hesitant to acknowledge any differences with the 
iconic  Hawke and Keating governments, even using Bob Hawke as 
a  figurehead in campaign advertising. Bowen answered critics who 
accused Labor of moving away from Paul Keating’s support for tax cuts 
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by pointing out that Keating would not have supported an unfunded 
cut to corporate tax, and had only supported such cuts as part of a tax 
package that increased revenue from other sources (Bowen 2016b). 
He also claimed that neither he nor Shorten ‘oppose corporate tax relief as 
a matter of ideology, but as a matter of hard-nosed prioritisation’ (ibid.). 
A concern with eventual fiscal balancing in the longer term indeed led to 
some hard Labor decisions (such as only reinstituting $2 billion of the 
Coalition’s proposed $57 billion cut to hospitals in the 2014 Budget, or 
reducing family tax benefit for families earning over $100,000) (Shorten 
2016o; Shorten, Bowen and Burke 2016). As Shorten put it: ‘[O]ver the 
next four and 10 years we start the action to fundamentally reduce the 
level of government debt in this country. We will need to make difficult 
decisions as this election unfolds’ (Shorten, Bowen and Burke 2016). 
Labor pledged that while deficits would be bigger in the first few years 
than those projected by the Coalition, budgets would be brought back into 
surplus by the same year as the Coalition pledged—2021 (ibid.). Bowen 
suggested it was ridiculous that Labor was accused of being antibusiness 
by the Coalition, just because they were suggesting that business continue 
to pay the existing tax rate.
If you believe the rhetoric of the government, you would be forgiven for 
thinking our policy is reminiscent of Che Guevara. In fact, we are simply 
arguing that the budget can’t afford at this time to change the tax rate 
Peter Costello introduced (Bowen 2016b).
Nonetheless, there was more than just a shift in populist rhetoric 
particularly targeting Turnbull’s links with business and the big end 
of town. It was noticeable that Labor was making far fewer statements 
explicitly mentioning the positive role of private enterprise and markets in 
the economy, compared not just with Hawke and Keating but also with 
Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard (Johnson 2011: 562–79). It was as though, 
after deciding to reject key elements of their 30-year engagement with 
neoliberalism, Labor had forgotten how it had nuanced its message to the 
electorate prior to then. Claims Labor is antibusiness can scare electors 
by suggesting that Labor will not be able to manage an economy in 
which the private sector plays such a crucial role, including as employers 
of many voters. Traditionally, Labor has tended to argue that its policies 
were fortuitously in the interests of both labour and socially beneficial 
sections of private enterprise; that there is a harmony of interests between 
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the two (Johnson 1989).4 For example, even when Ben Chifley advocated 
nationalising the banks, he argued that he was doing so not only because 
their financial practices harmed workers, but because the banks had failed 
to give essential credit to small business in times of economic downturn 
and had also failed to fund the development of Australian manufacturing 
industry because of their links with competing overseas capital (Johnson 
1986: 48–49). In the 2016 election campaign, Labor did emphasise that 
its policies were good for economic growth, but rarely explicitly spelled 
out that this meant they were also good for business.
Labor and social issues
Labor’s rejection of the small-target strategy did not just cover economic 
issues. It also extended to many social issues (though Labor continued to 
support turning back asylum-seeker boats, and the offshore processing 
of asylum seekers). Shorten strongly supported Indigenous equality and 
reconciliation, implying that he might support a Treaty, and denounced 
‘systemic racism’ (Shorten 2016g, 2016k). Shorten strongly supported 
equal rights for women—in political representation, in countering 
domestic violence, in terms of encouraging women into new information 
technology careers and in terms of equal pay (Shorten 2016i, 2016j, 
2016k; ALP n.d.-b). He had ‘always been a feminist’ (Shorten, Bowen 
and Burke 2016).
Shorten began a major appearance in the western Sydney suburb of Penrith 
with a statement of empathy, not only for the victims of the US Orlando 
massacre and their families, but also for the pain that members of the 
Australian lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) community 
would be feeling (Shorten 2016k).5 Labor supported marriage equality 
(albeit formally retaining a conscience vote until around 2019) arguing:
at its heart, marriage equality is about removing discrimination from our 
laws. It is a recognition that love between two people of the same gender is 
of equal meaning, equal value and entitled to equal respect (ALP n.d.-d). 
4  Yet Shorten articulated clear social harmony arguments in his own book (as well as having 
a reputation as a union official who sometimes negotiated deals that were too conciliatory towards 
business) (see Shorten 2016a: 4–5, 26).
5  Indeed, after the Orlando shootings, a number of LGBTI leaders argued that Turnbull should 
drop the idea of a plebiscite (Power 2016).
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By contrast, Labor stated that ‘Malcolm Turnbull’s plebiscite will give 
a taxpayer-funded platform and a megaphone to the very worst forms 
of hateful abuse’ (ibid). Labor also pledged to support the ‘Safe schools’ 
antihomophobic bullying program from being cut when the Turnbull 
government would cease funding (ALP n.d.-e). Earlier Shorten had stated: 
So when it comes to the welfare of our children, if I have to choose between: 
the teachers, the principals and the school counsellors of Australia, or the 
rabid ideologues of the Liberal-National parties – I will choose Australian 
teachers and schools any day. Mr Turnbull has a very simple choice here. 
Stand with the great majority of Australians or a small right-wing fringe. 
Today we will see how scared he is of his Liberal party (Shorten 2016e).
Consequently, Labor’s increased emphasis on an equality agenda not only 
reflected changing Labor values, it was being used to suggest that the 
Liberals were deepening inequality. More specifically, it was being used to 
target Turnbull’s ideological position in another way, by suggesting that 
Turnbull had backtracked on his own moderate, small ‘l’ liberal beliefs by 
giving in to conservative forces in his own party on issues ranging from 
climate change and the republic to same-sex marriage (Shorten 2016h).
In other words, Labor was suggesting that Turnbull was simultaneously 
dangerously ideological in his support for big business and ‘trickle-down’ 
economics while being untrue to his own ideological position on socially 
progressive issues. Shorten questioned Turnbull’s masculinity, suggesting 
that he was ‘a weak man beholden to the right wing of his party’ (Shorten 
2016o). Anthony Albanese, a senior minister from the Labor Left, argued 
that voters were disappointed in Turnbull because ‘when they look at 
Malcolm Turnbull, they hear Tony Abbott’ (Albanese 2016).
The Liberals and economic policy
Turnbull came to office portraying a positive message of hope and 
claiming  that ‘there has never been a more exciting time to be an 
Australian’ (Turnbull and Bishop 2015). His government would have 
a plan to ensure that Australia could meet the economic and technological 
challenges ahead, but one that would be based on being ‘a thoroughly 
Liberal Government committed to freedom, the individual and the 
market’—in other words, committed to the traditional tenets of Liberal 




However, by the time of the election, Turnbull was increasingly aware that 
some people were feeling concerned rather than excited ‘about the security 
of their job, the prospects for their business, the security for their children’s 
jobs’ (Turnbull 2016e). There were leaks from within the Coalition 
(Mayer 2016) that internal polling revealed many voters were nervous 
about Turnbull’s claims that Australians were living in ‘exciting times’ and 
preferred Howard’s aim of making voters ‘relaxed and comfortable’. Some 
conservative MPs claimed that, while it might play well in inner-city seats 
such as the Prime Minister’s own Sydney electorate of Wentworth, it did 
not go down well in suburban or regional seats. In the words of one MP: 
nobody knows what it is about. If they do know, they are scared of it. 
They don’t want to live in exciting times. If you are a truck driver or bank 
teller, it might cost you your job (cited in Mayer 2016). 
Consequently, Turnbull finessed this message, arguing that they were 
exciting but also challenging and uncertain times that required good 
economic management (Turnbull 2016g). He acknowledged that 
‘hardworking Australians are seeing this reality on the nightly news—how 
trade, globalization, and, above all, technological change is producing both 
new opportunities and also uncertainty in their world’ given an ‘intensely 
competitive and volatile’ global economy (Turnbull 2016f ). He pledged 
that the government’s economic plan would ‘deliver stronger economic 
growth and more jobs and better jobs and take advantage of the great 
opportunities in the current economic environment’ (Turnbull 2016e).
Turnbull argued that Australians were faced with ‘two very different 
versions of what Australia should look like in the future’ (Turnbull 
2016f ). The Coalition’s economic plan would make Australia a successful, 
innovative, twenty-first-century economy in which ‘we can secure our 
future as a high-wage first world economy with a generous social safety 
net’ (ibid.). By contrast, Labor seemed to assume that economic growth 
would continue however much they taxed or spent (ibid.). Shorten was 
‘setting up an anti-business, high-taxing high-spending, big borrowing 
program that will put our economy backwards. It will put our economy 
into reverse. It will put the jobs of every Australian at risk’ (Turnbull 
2016g). Labor was engaging in ‘class war’ and ‘the politics of envy’ 
(Turnbull 2016b). In short, while Turnbull denied that he himself was 
ideological, he accused Shorten of running ‘an incredibly ideological war 
against business’ and therefore against the interests of economic growth 
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and everyone employed in the private sector (Turnbull 2016e, 2016r).6 
Turnbull’s support for greater restraint on government spending and 
tax cuts for business was quite consistent with his previous positions, 
including his arguments against what he saw as the excessive Labor 
spending in the Rudd government’s stimulus package during the global 
financial crisis (GFC), and that government’s failure to institute tax cuts 
instead (Turnbull 2009).
However, Turnbull attempted to counter Labor scare campaigns about 
public sector cuts by stating that the government would never privatise 
Medicare.
Medicare is a core government service. It will always be delivered by the 
government and every element of Medicare’s activities will continue to 
be delivered by the government … Now what Mr Shorten is doing … is 
running is a disgraceful scare campaign (Turnbull, Joyce and Nash 2016).
Turnbull also made an effort to depict himself as more caring and 
empathetic, arguing for example that, if re-elected, his government 
‘will invest $15 million to ensure older Australians feel safe, cared for, and 
respected’ (Turnbull 2016i). Despite calling the election on two policies 
designed to curb union power (a position that Turnbull also claimed was 
not ideological), Turnbull gave an undertaking that ‘we will not make 
any changes to penalty rates. It is a matter for the independent umpire, 
the Fair Work Commission’, but ruled out the government making 
a submission, as Shorten had pledged to do, in support of penalty rates 
(Turnbull 2016j, 2016q).
The government did not always provide a great deal of detail regarding 
their economic plans, other than support for measures such as tax cuts. 
Turnbull had an ideological dilemma. He wanted to develop an agile, 
innovative, twenty-first-century economy. However, given his neoliberal-
influenced views, he also believed in there being limits on how much 
government should intervene in the economy, despite occasional forays 
to shore up shipbuilding or the steel industry in electorally at-risk seats 
(Turnbull 2016m, 2016p). In such situations, talking up innovation 
and opportunities is actually seen as one of the important ways in which 
government can change the culture. Rhetoric about changing the culture 
to make it more entrepreneurial and friendly to innovation is seen as itself 
contributing to an increase in business confidence.
6  Turnbull regularly claims not to be ideological (see Crabb 2016: 175–78).
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The Liberals and social issues
In an interview with Peter Hartcher (2016), Turnbull strongly denied 
Labor claims that he was rejecting his own previous ideological positions 
on progressive social issues. He pointed out that he still supported 
a republic and that the issue should be revisited when the Queen’s reign 
ends. On climate change, Turnbull argued that ‘Australia would meet 
its emissions reduction targets by 2020, and could strengthen policies if 
necessary to meet 2030 targets’ (Hartcher 2016). Turnbull restated his 
support for same-sex marriage. However, he noted that he had inherited a 
plebiscite and, despite having previously argued against one, it would be 
too hard to remove the possibility of a popular vote now (ibid.).
Turnbull might have been hamstrung by socially conservative forces in his 
party in terms of supporting a plebiscite on same-sex marriage. However, 
the tone of the statements he made during the election campaign was 
very different from that of his immediate Liberal prime ministerial 
predecessors, particularly Howard, especially when it came to ‘Culture 
Wars’ issues, in which socially conservative values had been mobilised 
against more ‘progressive’ views on issues such as race, gender and sexuality. 
Turnbull proudly proclaimed that ‘I would describe myself as a feminist’ 
and supported encouraging women into STEM (Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics) areas (Turnbull 2016d). He also strongly 
supported policies for Indigenous entrepreneurship and reconciliation 
(Turnbull 2016c). Furthermore, rather than mobilising Howard-style 
arguments about ‘black armband’ views, Turnbull argued that we needed 
to be prepared ‘to look into the darkest corners’ of our history (ibid.).
The difference with both Howard and Abbott was particularly clear 
in the wake of the Orlando massacre in the US. A few days after this 
event, Turnbull hosted an Iftar dinner, ending the Ramadan fast. Unlike 
Howard or Abbott, there was no emphasis on the Anglo-Celtic heart at 
the core of Australian identity. Rather, Turnbull used the occasion to state 
that ‘we are the most successful and harmonious multicultural society 
in the world. Our multicultural success is at the heart of our national 
identity. It is intrinsic to our history and our character’ (Turnbull 2016h). 
While denouncing the perversions of Islam used by terrorists, Turnbull 
stated that ‘by breaking bread, by sharing food across religions and by 
bringing diverse people of diverse backgrounds together, we embody 
Islam’s emphasis on the diversity of humanity’ (ibid.). He praised the 
contributions that Muslims had made to Australian society from the days 
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of the ‘Makassan fishermen who traded with our first Australians in the 
1600s, to the Afghan camel drivers who opened up the interior of our vast 
continent’ and continued with the contributions that Muslims of every 
profession and calling continue to make to Australia (ibid.). He assured 
Australian Muslims: 
that the Australian Muslim community is valued and respected – and it 
is not confined to a narrow security prism – you are an integral part of an 
Australian family that rests on the essential foundation of mutual respect 
and understanding. Every one of us is enriched by the culture and the 
faiths of our friends and neighbours (ibid.).
He subsequently stated that he would not have invited a sheikh who had 
homophobic views if he had known, because ‘I will always condemn any 
remarks which disrespect any part of our community, whether it is on the 
basis of their sexuality, their gender, their race, their religion’ (Turnbull, 
Joyce and Nash 2016). Nonetheless, while he avoided ‘Culture War’–
style arguments on other issues, Turnbull endorsed the effectiveness of 
both Howard’s and Abbott’s polices on stopping asylum-seeker boats. 
He argued, ‘[W]e have once again restored the security of our borders. 
The security which Labor abandoned’ (Turnbull 2016r).
Insofar as there were ‘Culture Wars’–style comments highlighted in the 
campaign, they tended to be made by Liberal politicians other than 
Turnbull. A key example, in regard to heteronormative ideology and same-
sex marriage, was exemplified in an exchange of views between Penny 
Wong and Scott Morrison. Wong had argued that heterosexual politicians 
who supported a plebiscite did not adequately appreciate or acknowledge 
that encountering hate speech was part of gays’ and lesbians’ everyday 
life. The plebiscite would therefore undoubtedly unleash homophobia 
that would be very hurtful to many gays and lesbians and their families 
(Wong 2016b). Morrison responded by saying that he did understand 
Wong’s concern because:
I know it from personal experience, having been exposed to that sort 
of hatred and bigotry for the views I’ve taken … Frankly people of very 
strong religious views have been subject to quite dreadful hate speech and 
bigotry (cited in Dziedzic and Norman 2016).
However, Wong argued that Morrison’s situation was fundamentally 
different because while all politicians ‘receive pretty robust’ emails, gays 
and lesbians are ‘targeted in their schools and in their workplaces as well 
as in public. They’re not targeted because of their beliefs or the things 
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that they say. They are targeted because of who they are’ (Wong 2016c). 
Furthermore, in her original comments, Wong had pointed out that there 
was not only a long history of male homosexuality being illegal, and of 
legal discrimination against gays and lesbians when it came to citizens’ 
rights and entitlements, but that many gays and lesbians were still fearful 
of the consequences of even holding hands in public (Wong 2016b). 
Consequently:
it would be good if people had some empathy and compassion for the 
experience of LGBTI Australians, gay and lesbian Australians, young 
people in our schools who are still at greater risk of suicide because of the 
prejudice and discrimination they experience (Wong 2016c).
The exchange between Wong and Morrison is particularly relevant to the 
analysis of ideology in this chapter because it harked back to Howard-era 
‘Culture War’ arguments that it was actually ‘mainstream’ Australians who 
were being predominantly discriminated against by ‘politically correct’ 
views about minority rights (Johnson 2007: 39–72). Empathy was to 
be reserved for the put-upon ‘mainstream’, rather than minority groups. 
So Morrison’s argument was an important signal to socially conservative 
voters that such perspectives were still present amongst government MPs, 
despite Prime Minister Turnbull’s own more small ‘l’ liberal beliefs. 
Turnbull himself largely avoided discussing such issues. He simply asserted 
his belief that the plebiscite would pass (thereby revealing an underlying 
assumption that numbers in the new Senate would not allow a plebiscite 
to be blocked) and that legislation in support of same-sex marriage would 
then ‘sail through the Parliament’ (Turnbull 2016o).7 There were also other 
signs that Turnbull was reluctant to engage in ‘Culture War’ arguments 
to shore up socially conservative ideology. For example, Turnbull alerted 
socially conservative MPs, and ‘Culture War’ warriors, such as George 
Christensen and Cory Bernardi, to the need to be cautious about the 
language used when discussing issues such as the Safe Schools program 
and same-sex marriage (Turnbull 2016a, 2016n; though on the latter see 
Bernardi’s denial in Lewis 2016).
The Coalition has run scare campaigns in many previous elections 
suggesting that a Labor government would be bad for the economy. 
In respect to economic policy, the ideological position of the Turnbull 
7  This assumption would ultimately prove incorrect. In November 2016, the Senate defeated the 
proposed plebiscite 33 votes to 29.
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government going into the election was very similar to that of previous 
Liberal positions. However, despite arguments that Turnbull had sold out 
to the social conservatives of his party on key issues, it was noticeable that 
Turnbull avoided mobilising ‘Culture War’ fears, although he did play 
the ‘border security’ card. By contrast, Howard had aimed to develop an 
electoral coalition of socially conservative ‘mainstream’ Australians, which 
also targeted Labor-voting economic ‘battlers’ who were concerned about 
social change. Indeed, Howard had attempted to reconcile voters to rapid 
economic change by suggesting that social change could be held back 
(Johnson 2007: 39–72). It was a mantle that Abbott, and other social 
conservatives in the Liberal Party, had largely inherited. Turnbull’s vision 
of a Liberal voter’s identity seemed to be more diffuse and less clearly 
articulated. Turnbull made traditional Liberal appeals to those concerned 
about sound economic management, free markets, economic growth and 
jobs. However, the ‘exciting’ future he was selling also highlighted a focus 
on innovation that may have been more attractive to entrepreneurial 
sections of the business community than to some ordinary voters. His 
focus on social diversity pleased moderate Liberal voters and could have 
crossover appeal to some Labor and Greens voters. However, it also risked 
alienating some former Liberal voters who had supported Howard’s and 
Abbott’s social conservatism.
Major parties—differentiating themselves 
from the minor parties
Key minor parties are analysed in more depth in the chapters by Gregg 
Cockfield and Jennifer Curtin, Glenn Kefford and Stewart Jackson in 
this volume. However, both major parties drew on their key ideological 
positions to distance themselves from minor parties and Independents and 
to implicate their opponents in what they depicted as extreme policies. 
(Though the Liberals depicted their permanent Coalition partner, the 
Nationals, as being part of a stable majority government.) For example, 
Turnbull argued that the Greens and Xenophon were opposing free trade 
and would add their weight to the pressure the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU) was already placing on Labor to re-open free trade 
agreements (Turnbull 2016f ). In Turnbull’s view: ‘it is another pointer 
to the chaos and economic uncertainty likely to arise if a Labor–Greens–
Independents alliance is revived at this election’ (ibid.). Turnbull contrasted 
such uncertainty with the ‘stable Coalition majority government which 
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I lead’, emphasising that such stability was needed to tackle the economic 
and other challenges ahead (Turnbull 2016s). Meanwhile, Morrison put 
out an attack ad, ‘The Greening of Labor’, suggesting that Labor was 
being infiltrated and pressured by Greens into taking up ideologically 
extreme positions (Liberal Party of Australia 2016). Turnbull also moved 
to distance the Liberals from Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. In line with 
his own small ‘l’ liberal position on social issues, Turnbull argued that 
‘Pauline Hanson is not a welcome presence on the Australian political 
scene—remember she was chucked out of the Liberal party’ (SBS 2016).
By contrast, Shorten claimed that, despite such statements, Turnbull was 
actually under increasing pressure from the right in his party to embrace 
the type of ‘extreme’, socially divisive policies advocated by Pauline 
Hanson and that this pressure would become even greater in the aftermath 
of international developments such as the Brexit vote (Shorten 2016o). 
Similarly, far from seeing Xenophon as being in the same camp as Labor, 
Shorten argued that Xenophon-team candidates could not be trusted to 
stand up for workers’ penalty rates and actually had more in common 
with the Liberals on such issues (Shorten 2016n). Meanwhile, Deputy 
Leader of the Labor Party Tanya Plibersek mounted a sustained attack on 
the Greens, claiming that their extreme ideological rigidity undermined 
Labor’s ability to bring in reforms (which often involved a long and 
incremental process). Furthermore, she argued that the Greens’ strategy of 
trying to grow by targeting Labor voters rather than Coalition ones meant 
that the Greens saw Labor as their immediate enemy. Consequently, 
she claimed that the Greens’ electoral strategy could end up assisting 
the conservative side of politics and preventing the election of a Labor 
government (Plibersek 2016). Shorten totally denied that Labor would 
be prepared to form either a ‘coalition’ or an ‘alliance’ with the Greens, 
emphasising the importance of voting for the certainty that would be 
provided by a Labor majority government (Shorten 2016m).
In other words, both major parties argued for the need to elect a majority 
government that, they claimed, would provide stability and policy 
certainty. Both suggested that their major party opponents would be 
hostage to ideologically extreme, minor party views.
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Conclusion
The narrowness of the Coalition’s victory raises some questions about 
whether neoliberal economic policy is so easy to sell to the electorate these 
days, or whether Turnbull was partly facing the type of economic protest 
vote that Shorten had hoped to address with his more economically 
inclusive policies.8 It is also possible that Turnbull’s relative reluctance to 
mobilise ‘Culture War’ issues, combined with his neoliberal economics, 
opened up opportunities for protest votes for extreme right parties, such as 
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, given their combination of Islamophobia 
and protectionism.
There were significant policy differences and perspectives between the 
major parties in the 2016 election, even if both claimed that only their 
opponents were ideological. Those ideological positions were reinforced 
via the evoking of emotion. Labor’s ‘Mediscare’ campaign, for example, 
reinforced social democratic views on government providing good-quality 
public healthcare, while the Coalition’s scare campaign that Labor was 
antibusiness and would ruin the economy reinforced their neoliberal 
ideology. Class and same-sex issues were also mobilised by both sides to 
make ideological points.
Somewhat unusually, Labor criticised Turnbull for being too ideological 
on economic policy and not ideological enough when it came to 
maintaining his small ‘l’ beliefs. Meanwhile, Turnbull criticised Labor 
for being ideologically antibusiness—a criticism that was potentially 
reinforced by (the historical aberration of ) Labor’s reluctance to spell out 
explicitly that many of its policies would benefit both labour and private 
enterprise. While Labor had firmly rejected a small-target strategy, was 
articulating a clearer ideological position than in some previous elections 
and had achieved a better result than many had anticipated, its primary 
vote remained relatively low (at 34.73 per cent, though up 1.35 per cent 
from the last election). Among other issues, Labor needs to reflect on 
whether its populist antibusiness rhetoric made it more difficult for it to 
counter the Coalition’s claims that it was antibusiness and would therefore 
be a poor economic manager. 
8  Paul Strangio (2016) has suggested that Turnbull is facing a historically changing policy cycle, 





My thanks for useful feedback from the editors and participants in the 
election workshop. This chapter draws on some material produced as 
part of an Australian Research Council–funded project (DP140100168) 
entitled, ‘Expanding equality: A historical perspective on developments 
and dilemmas in contemporary Australian social democracy’.
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